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Balancing of Global Interests 
4(1) TRADE L. & DEV. 200 (2012) 
 
 
EPISTEMIC CONTESTS AND LEGITIMACY OF THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE BRAZIL – USA COTTON 
DISPUTE AND INCREMENTAL BALANCING OF GLOBAL 
INTERESTS 
 
 
ARTHUR DAEMMRICH* 
 
 
The World Trade Organization [WTO] features prominently in studies of 
international institutions, often cast either as a tool of rich-world domination over the 
poorer South or as a neutral mediator facilitating a tariff-free world of economic 
prosperity. This article instead analyses how the WTO has sought legitimacy for itself 
and for the underlying institution of free trade in the midst of questions regarding its 
organizational mandate and management of international trade negotiations. 
Historically, legitimacy for GATT and later the WTO was understood to derive from 
expanding membership and success at major trade round negotiations. In the past 
decade, and despite a lack of progress in the Doha Round, legitimacy has been built 
through institutional deepening by means of dispute resolution processes. This shift, I 
argue, raises epistemic questions of expertise, the relationship of models to real-world 
outcomes, and methods for bounding disputes over scientific facts. Based on a case 
study of the Brazil – Upland Cotton dispute and a trend analysis of over 400 total 
WTO disputes, I find that the WTO dispute settlement process is helping to 
legitimize the institution of free trade through its public display of rational authority 
and neutral expertise. At the same time, dispute panels have begun to pass judgment 
on issues of econometric and scientific uncertainty. As a result, the basis for the 
broader legitimacy of the WTO is shifting from questions of representation that have 
long drawn attention to epistemic issues, especially concerning the design of 
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international trade models. The article thus provides insights on the resolution of 
disputes in global trade while contributing to our understanding of the evolving role of 
modelling at international organizations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Epistemic contests featuring competing models of reality and the nature of 
knowledge are on the rise. In areas as diverse as trade disputes, climate change 
negotiations and the regulation of embryonic stem cell therapies, governments, 
industries and social movements dispute the factual findings along with the 
underlying models and methods on which they are based.1 While they typically 
manifest in controversies over specific claims, for example, how producers 
respond to government subsidies or whether genetically modified crops pose 
health risks, epistemic contests ultimately involve debates over which of two or 
more approaches to knowing is most valid, and therefore, represents the most 
promising path to a policy decision.2  The solution seems obvious: agree on a 
                                                 
1 SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE 
AND THE UNITED STATES 192-202 (Princeton Univ. Press 2005) [hereinafter JASANOFF]; 
Clark A. Miller, Epistemic Constitutionalism in International Governance: The Case of Climate 
Change, in FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 141 (M. Heazle et al. 
eds., 2009); James K. Sebenius, Challenging Conventional Explanations of International 
Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities, 46 INT’L  ORG. 323 
(1992); Steve Yearley, Sociology and Climate Change after Kyoto, 57 CURRENT SOC. 389 (2009). 
2 Christophe Bonneuil & Les Levidow, How does the World Trade Organization know? The 
Mobilization and Staging of Expertise in the GMO Trade Dispute, 42 SOC. STUD. SCI. 75 (2012); 202                                          Trade, Law and Development                                             [Vol. 4: 200 
method, run laboratory or field experiments, and then adopt policy reforms. Yet, 
in many significant areas of contemporary international policy, consensus on 
underlying methods for determining scientific or economic truth is proving 
impossible to achieve. Parties to disputes each bring their own facts and framings, 
thus stymying the possibility of an agreement. While prospects for global 
agreements may seem hopeless in light of the use of uncertainty in scientific 
knowledge by opposing camps and the entrenched interests of industries and 
governments worldwide, in a few areas significant progress has been made toward 
dispute closure. This article analyses the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the 
World Trade Organization [WTO] as an example of an organization with the 
capacity to overcome the stasis that otherwise accompanies epistemic contests.  
 
Almost immediately after their launch in 2001, the Doha Round of WTO 
negotiations entered a prolonged stalemate.3  A North – South divide emerged 
regarding agricultural subsidies, enforcement of intellectual property rights, and 
other so-called “non-tariff” topics of concern to governments worldwide. Notable 
among these are government procurement, international capital flows into or out 
of equity markets, and environmental and health regulations. Prevailing economic 
models that linked enforcement of intellectual property rights and neo-liberal 
market reforms to sustainable economic growth came under attack. Walkouts from 
negotiating sessions and heated rhetoric concerning the very purpose of free trade 
talks took centre stage. After years of expanding participation and broadening the 
WTO’s mandate, participating countries became deadlocked. As the stalemate 
continued into the early 2010s, bilateral and regional trade agreements increased in 
number, fewer countries joined the WTO, and the WTO’s legitimacy as the 
premier negotiating forum for international trade issues came under question. 
 
In the same period, however, dispute resolution proceedings at the WTO grew 
considerably. International trade disputes involve the WTO in the adjudication of 
complex competing claims, typically backed by divergent econometric models and 
conflicting scientific and market data. Through an analysis of over 400 disputes to 
date, I find that in the first five years after founding of the WTO, developed 
countries brought the majority of claims against both other developed and 
developing countries whereas, by the latter half of the 2000s disputes were on a 
more even footing. Of special importance as precedents are claims that were 
brought with success by developing countries against agricultural and other 
subsidies in the United States and European Union. As member countries began to 
adhere to WTO rulings, a positive feedback loop was established in which 
                                                                                                                         
Anne Ingeborg Myhr, The Challenge of Scientific Uncertainty and Disunity in Risk Assessment and 
Management of GM Crops, 19 ENVTL. VALUES 7 (2010). 
3 For a recent discussion of the Doha Round, see  Petros C. Mavroidis, Doha, Dohalf or 
Dohaha? The WTO Licks its Wounds, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 367 (2011). Summer, 2012]                       Epistemic Contests & Legitimacy of the WTO                               203 
 
countries ranging from rich to poor accepted the authority of the WTO as a 
governing body. Thus, even as negotiations in the Doha Round stagnated, the 
WTO increased its role as the principal adjudicator of international trade disputes. 
In the process, the DSB began to establish precedents for the role of expert 
knowledge and started to rule on the validity of competing scientific and 
econometric models. Thus, even as thorny questions of North – South 
representation and balance among competing interests drew the attention of 
policymakers who understood them as vital to the WTO’s future and to the 
institutional legitimacy of the international trading system, novel issues of expertise 
arose alongside the WTO’s emergent juridical role. 
 
This article contributes to scholarship of the WTO, and by implication to the 
study of other novel international governance bodies, through a focus on the 
institutional basis for legitimacy and an analysis of epistemic contests that arise 
during trade disputes. The next section summarizes and builds upon scholarship 
into legitimacy and expertise from the academic fields of political economy and 
science and technology studies [STS]. In the third section, data tracking WTO 
membership and a trend analysis of 424 disputes initiated since 1995 are presented 
to develop the argument that the basis for legitimacy shifted in recent years from 
membership growth and associated network effects to dispute settlement.4 The 
significance of expertise to trade disputes, and the resulting potential for epistemic 
contests, is next analyzed through a case study of the lengthy Brazil – Upland Cotton 
dispute. The conclusion draws the analysis together with reflections on 
institutional legitimacy and expertise in the contemporary era of globalization. The 
analysis of the WTO developed here is crucial, I suggest, to understanding 
international institutions and ongoing developments in globalization writ large. 
 
II. DILEMMAS OF LEGITIMACY AND EXPERTISE 
 
While critics of the WTO use the term “legitimacy” (or frequently, 
“illegitimacy”) when objecting to the economic shifts that have accompanied the 
lowering of trade barriers, I use the term here as an analytical concept aligned to 
scholarship in political science and STS. Specifically, legitimacy has been used to 
explain collective obedience to laws, rules, and edicts in the absence of omnipotent 
coercive power. However, extrapolating from the citizenry of a country obeying its 
leaders to countries ceding power to international institutions has posed 
conceptual challenges for scholars, alongside the practical challenges confronted by 
                                                 
4 For more on network effects and international trade, see Peter Swann, International 
Standards and Trade: A Review of the Empirical Literature (OECD Trade Pol’y, Working Papers, 
Paper No. 97, 2010), available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/59/45500791.pdf; 
Luca De Benedictis & Lucia Tajoli, The World Trade Network, 34 WORLD ECON. 1417 
(2011). 204                                          Trade, Law and Development                                             [Vol. 4: 200 
organizations like the WTO. This article holds that a next step in the study of 
institutional legitimacy will come from perspectives developed in STS, notably, the 
study of dilemmas inherent to expertise in democratic systems and epistemic 
disputes that arise during scientific controversies. 
 
A. Legitimacy  and  Governance 
 
In political science, legitimacy has been used to understand the emergence of 
stable modern democracies, to compare institutional variation between nation-
states, and more recently, to assess the success or failure of global governance 
bodies.5 Conceptually, legitimacy has a long history, dating at a minimum to John 
Locke’s emphasis on the importance of “consent by the governed” to the 
formation and stability of government.6 Studying democratic governance broadly, 
and the emerging United States specifically, Alexis de Tocqueville drew attention 
to the specific notion of legitimacy in the 1840s.Commenting on Americans, he 
observed, “from Maine to Florida, from Missouri to the Atlantic Ocean, they 
believe that the origin of all legitimate powers is in the people”.7 Max Weber’s 
study of political and social structures in the early 20th century advanced a typology 
of legitimacy across different institutions and over time, specifically under 
traditional, charismatic, or rational-legal authority.8 Depending on the model of 
governance, legitimacy of rules by which a society functioned were either pre-
ordained, upheld through a single powerful leader, or written and revised through 
defined procedures. Drawing on this lineage, the political scientist Seymour Lipset 
in the late 1950s defined legitimacy as “the capacity of a political system to 
engender the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or 
proper ones for the society”. Of lasting importance to the analysis of political 
systems, Lipset added, “the determination of when new social groups shall obtain 
access to the political process affects the legitimacy of the political system”.9 
                                                 
5  Michael  Zürn,  Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and other 
International Institutions, 6 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 183 (2000); for a useful recent collection of 
essays on legitimacy and international organizations, see the special issue of Review of 
International Political Economy on “Legitimacy and Global Governance”, introduced by: James 
Brassetta & Elani Tsingou, The Politics of Legitimate Global Governance, 18 REV. INT’L POL. 
ECON. 1 (2011). 
6 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) 
(1690), esp. Second Treatise, § 95-99. 
7 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 358 (Harvey C. Mansfield & 
Delba Winthrop trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000). 
8  MAX  WEBER,  ECONOMY AND SOCIETY:  AN  OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE 
SOCIOLOGY 212-45 (Günther Roth  
& Claus Wittich trans., Univ. of California Press 1978). 
9  Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959), quotes at 86 & 88. Summer, 2012]                       Epistemic Contests & Legitimacy of the WTO                               205 
 
Scholarship on legitimacy gained a new impetus from the proliferation of 
international organizations over the past three decades and the resulting expansion 
of governance in the absence of an international sovereign. Turning to global 
governance, Allan Buchanan and Robert Keohane have distinguished between 
normative legitimacy, “the right to rule”, and a sociological basis for legitimacy, 
“when it [the institution] is widely believed to have the right to rule”.10 Critics of 
organizations like the WTO, they observe, want to argue that multilateral 
governance lacks the right to rule because of a failure to protect human rights, 
labour, or the environment. Yet much of the scholarship on legitimacy drops 
sociological or historical considerations– in which institutions would be evaluated 
for their ability to earn the trust of interested communities over time, or in which 
researchers would seek to shed critical perspective on public demonstrations of 
legitimacy – to focus instead on normative criteria.11 As part of this agenda, metrics 
for legitimacy have been proposed, including institutional integrity (actual 
performance measured against self-proclaimed goals), inclusiveness, accountability, 
transparency, and comparative benefit (substantive and procedural outcomes 
superior to those expected in the absence of the organization).12 
 
At various points during its history since the end of WWII, the institution of 
free trade has confronted and overcome normative challenges to its legitimacy. 
However, it would be a mistake to suggest a planned, sequential process has built 
legitimacy for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] or its 
successor, the WTO. Instead, the history of legitimizing free trade has involved 
advancing conceptual and economic arguments for reduced tariffs and other trade 
barriers while also persuading political elites of the benefits of GATT and WTO as 
the rule-makers for free trade. But a limit may have been reached. First, under the 
“bicycle theory” of trade, sequential liberalization builds the political support 
necessary to sustain the WTO and advance a new round of talks.13However, as the 
Doha Round’s deadlock extends into a second decade, the domestic support 
necessary to sustain the WTO has begun to decline in both developed and 
developing countries. Second, free trade advocates have done little to manage 
either predicted (e.g., shifts in employment) or less expected (e.g., intensification of 
inequality) disruptions from global trade, sparking a backlash. The economist Dani 
                                                 
10 Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 
20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405 (2006). 
11 A similar point is made by Steven Bernstein, who has proposed that legitimacy 
involves the interaction of communities of actors with broader institutionalized norms or 
social structures. See Steven Bernstein, Legitimacy in Intergovernmental and Non-State Global 
Governance, 18 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 17 (2011). 
12 Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Legitimacy, 18 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 99 
(2011). 
13 Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, A Theory of Managed Trade, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 
779 (1990). 206                                          Trade, Law and Development                                             [Vol. 4: 200 
Rodrikhas suggested that globalization as an institution therefore is encountering a 
trilemma: it is impossible to simultaneously pursue democracy, national 
determination, and economic globalization.14 Third, while the DSB interprets trade 
agreements when ruling on disputes, only nations can enforce decisions. Nearly 
every ruling creates a domestic dilemma when organized special interests in the 
losing country object to a DSB decision. Furthermore, participating states with less 
economic clout are disadvantaged relative to wealthier countries, especially when 
imposing punitive tariffs will hurt poorer domestic consumers.  
 
This article draws upon these findings while advancing a historical approach to 
the analysis of legitimacy that is distinct from those found in the political economy 
literature referenced above. I argue that the basis for legitimacy is changing over 
time, especially as the WTO interacts with organized interests, including member 
countries and NGOs. As the WTO took on a decidedly juridical process alongside 
ongoing multilateral negotiations of the Doha Round, the basis for institutional 
legitimacy likewise shifted. I argue that for the WTO, organizational legitimacy, 
namely the acceptance by governments, firms, and social movements of the WTO 
as the premier organization for trade negotiations and resolution of trade disputes, 
is inseparably intertwined with institutional legitimacy, which rests on the concept 
that free trade will benefit economies internationally.15 Challenges to the WTO’s 
legitimacy that arise from its emerging function in adjudicating disputes, including 
decisions on models and econometric forecasting, thus have great significance for 
the underlying institution of free trade. 
 
B. Expertise  Contests 
 
Arguments concerning legitimacy and the institution of free trade developed 
here are congruent with scholarship in STS on institutions and international 
organizations. STS departs from traditional political science, especially international 
relations, through its inquiry into the source of (scientific) ideas and how they gain 
credibility and authority in international settings. Compelling accounts of the 
power of ideas, according to STS, need to specify how the ideas come to be 
framed in particular ways and how these framings come to shape institutions.16 
This article advances the analysis of political order resulting from particular 
                                                 
14 DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE 
OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 81-88, 200-206 (W.W. Norton 2011). 
15 For more on the distinction between organizations and institutions, see DOUGLASS 
C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3-
10 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990); Elias Khalil, Organizations versus Institutions, 151 J. INST. & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 445 (1995). 
16 Sheila Jasanoff & Brian Wynne, Science and Decision Making, in HUMAN CHOICE AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE SOCIETAL FRAMEWORK 1 (Steve Rayner & Elizabeth Malone eds., 
Batelle Press 1998). Summer, 2012]                       Epistemic Contests & Legitimacy of the WTO                               207 
 
framings of ideas through its focus on how the WTO has framed and adjudicated 
trade disputes to legitimise its organizational existence. Two topics of conceptual 
and empirical work in STS are of particular significance: dilemmas of expertise in 
international settings and the role of science in juridical proceedings. 
 
Quandaries associated with scientific, technical, and biomedical expertise have 
long occupied scholars in STS and serve as a point of departure for critical analyses 
of power relations and scientific authority.17 Sheila Jasanoff concisely identified a 
core dilemma associated with experts: “They tame the ignorance and uncertainty 
that are endemic to modernity and pose threats to modernity’s democratic and 
managerial pretensions.”18 In studies of international institutions, STS has found 
that scientific experts must justify knowledge claims to more diverse groups (by 
education, technical knowledge, and epistemological viewpoints) than their peers, 
including informally designed “deliberative democracy” initiatives.19 Other work 
on expertise has identified how it acts as a barrier to representative participation or 
can even trap experts in “double-binds” when they cannot both intervene and 
maintain norms of neutrality and disinterestedness.20 
 
For experts drawn into legal and regulatory disputes, a challenge arises 
concerning specific and general knowledge in an epistemic contest. The expert is 
asked to draw conclusions based on their general technical knowledge and 
experience, rather than from the detailed analysis or direct observation of a specific 
case. Expert testimony then involves two key steps: first, the identification of a fit 
or misfit between known scientific or economic principles and the case at hand; 
and second, advancing a narrative and theory to explain various points of 
misalignment.21 Yet, these activities do not take place in a policy vacuum. For 
example, in the WTO dispute described here, it became impossible for either the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture or the Government of Brazil and their hired 
                                                 
17  See, for example, SERGIO  SISMONDO,  AN  INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY  STUDIES 180-88 (2d ed., Wiley-Blackwell 2010); Barry Barnes & David 
Edge,  Science as Expertise,  in S CIENCE IN CONTEXT: READINGS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
SCIENCE 233 (Barry Barnes & David Edge eds.,  MIT Press 1982). 
18 JASANOFF, supra note 1, at 267. 
19 Eva Lövbrand et al., A Democracy Paradox in Studies of Science and Technology, 36 SCI. 
TECH. & HUM. VALUES 474 (2011). 
20   On expertise barriers, see Shobita Parthasarathy, Breaking the Expertise Barrier: 
Understanding Activist Challenges to Science and Technology Policy Domains, 37 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 
355 (2010); for the double-bind of expertise, see Arthur A. Daemmrich, A Tale of Two 
Experts: Thalidomide and Political Engagement in the United States and West Germany, 15 SOC. 
HIST. MED. 137 (2002). 
21 Joseph Sanders, Science, Law and the Expert Witness, 72 L.& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 
(2009); Arthur A. Daemmrich, The Evidence Does Not Speak for Itself: Expert Witnesses and the 
Organization of DNA-Typing Companies, 28 SOC. STUD. SCI. 741 (1998).  208                                          Trade, Law and Development                                             [Vol. 4: 200 
experts to create new knowledge about the economic and behavioural outcomes 
produced by agricultural subsidies in a form that was separable from its political 
and policy implications. As a result, disputes over the correlation of econometric 
models to the real world mutated into clashes over the basis for expertise. More 
generally, the use of experts by the WTO poses an organizational dilemma as it 
seeks legitimacy through democratic and managerial procedures. The WTO’s 
power increasingly lies in classifying, standardizing, and resolving epistemic 
disputes, including deciding on the validity of econometric models. This creates an 
inherent tension for the WTO going forward, and it may soon encounter epistemic 
challenges of the sort found regularly at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [IPCC] and at other international organizations.22 
 
Second, judicial cases and regulatory hearings have served as a productive site 
for scholars in STS to analyse disputes that depart from the bounded scepticism 
and often-collaborative peer-review system found in academic science. 23 
Adversarial court proceedings can become disputes over the basis for expertise. 
Assumptions integral to the operation of complex models may appear faulty once 
opened to the scrutiny of judges and juries. While some research has found that 
juries can adopt nuanced views of scientific certainty, defendants with greater 
resources find it easier to challenge evidence and dispute methods.24 To manage 
uncertainty and reduce blatant power asymmetries, courts and other organizations 
with judicial authority commonly narrow the kinds of evidence that can be 
presented and who can speak for it.25 WTO dispute procedures have evolved in 
precisely this direction; as they define discoverable facts, they also establish the 
basis for expertise and deepen the WTO’s standing as a judicial body. The DSB 
thus provides a structured approach to reasoning and deliberation, although unlike 
many legislative or judicial procedures, such as rulemaking by government agencies 
                                                 
22  For example, the authority of the IPCC has become deeply intertwined with 
disputes over approaches to modeling the global climate as well as causation of climate 
change;  see  Clark A. Miller, Resisting Empire: Globalism, Relocalization, and the Politics of 
Knowledge,  in E ARTHLY  POLITICS:  LOCAL AND GLOBAL IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE 81 (Sheila Jasanoff & Marybeth Long Martello eds., MIT Press 2004); Clark 
A. Miller, Democratization, International Knowledge Institutions, and Global Governance, 20 
GOVERNANCE  325 (2007). 
23 Robert K. Merton, The Normative Structure of Science, reprinted in ROBERT K. MERTON, 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 67-78 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979); STEVEN SHAPIN, A 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH 3-41 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1994). 
24  Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Scientific Literacy and the Jury: Reconsidering Jury 
‘Competence’, 6 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 329 (1997); MICHAEL LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH 
MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS  HISTORY OF DNA  FINGERPRINTING  39-68 (Univ. of 
Chicago Press 2008). 
25 SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN 
AMERICA (Harvard Univ. Press 1995). Summer, 2012]                       Epistemic Contests & Legitimacy of the WTO                               209 
 
or jury trials in common law systems, it is not particularly public, visible, or 
participatory. Nevertheless, the WTO seeks legitimacy through the protection of 
weak and minority interests in the international system, thereby responding to 
challenges raised by some critics regarding arbitrary coercion and exploitation at 
the global level.26 As a result, it is important to examine how the WTO responds to 
challenges over facts and the basis for scientific or economic knowledge, especially 
in cases with large wealth disparities between disputing parties. Of particular focus 
here are the ways in which contestation actually helps enable the exercise of power. 
As I will argue below, disputes at the WTO are now central to its institutional 
legitimacy and help to extend its functional role in a global free-trade system. 
 
This article contributes to the understanding of epistemic contests by 
analyzing questions of expertise and the fit between economic models and real-
world observations that arise in international trade disputes. I argue that through 
the development of a visibly deliberative approach to dispute resolution, the WTO 
gained legitimacy even though decision-making remains in the hands of a narrow 
band of technical and economic experts. According to the analysis developed here, 
the WTO dispute process is caught between representative legitimacy common to 
democratic systems and procedural legitimacy common to science and the law. 
Questions concerning the source and validity of knowledge claims about trade and 
development thus are not only central to the cotton dispute, but also figure 
generally in debates about the WTO’s legitimacy as the organization responsible 
for the international trading system. 
 
III. LEGITIMACY FROM MEMBERSHIP GROWTH AND DISPUTE 
MANAGEMENT 
 
From its origins in the 1944 Bretton Woods plans, participants in GATT 
sought to expand membership.27  Legitimacy of the GATT and the benefits of 
managed tariff reductions were demonstrated through additional countries joining 
during a period of growth; the membership grew from 23 countries negotiating the 
original GATT accords in 1946 to 128 signatory countries by 1994. After the 
founding of the WTO in 1995 and expansion of its mandate, issues of 
representation and reform of procedures governing negotiations came to the 
fore.28 The dispute settlement body, one of the major organizational innovations of 
                                                 
26  Robert  O.  Keohane,  Governance in a Partially Globalized World,  in G OVERNING 
GLOBALIZATION: POWER, AUTHORITY, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 325-46 (David Held 
& Anthony McGrew eds., Polity Press 2002). 
27 ANWARUL  HODA,  TARIFF  NEGOTIATIONS AND RENEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE 
GATT AND THE WTO: PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001). 
28 Nitsan Chorev & Sarah Babb, The Crisis of Neo liberalism and the Future of International 
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the Uruguay Round, came under particular attention concerning issues of access 
and balanced outcomes between developed and developing countries. This section 
traces this development in history and shows how the significance of dispute 
resolution has grown in the contemporary times to legitimise the WTO. 
 
A.  Founding the WTO 
 
The WTO was created in 1995 as part of a major Uruguay Round accord. 
During the nine years of negotiations starting in 1986, the Uruguay agenda covered 
tariff reductions on goods; non-tariff barriers, including subsidies, import 
procedures, government procurement, and customs valuation methods; new issues 
of intellectual property and international investment; and dispute settlement 
procedures. On April 15, 1994, the round was completed with pledges for 
significant tariff reductions, promises to remove non-tariff trade barriers, and an 
agreement on dispute resolution and enforcement governed by a new organization, 
the WTO. In addition to the existing GATT agreements, the WTO gained 
oversight of the new General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS], Trade-
related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS], Trade-Related Investment 
Measures [TRIMS], and sector-specific accords, including the Agreement on 
Agriculture [AoA], the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing [ATC], and a revised 
agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures [SPS]. Broadly, the WTO now 
had mandates that impinged on national governments in politically sensitive areas 
of agriculture, product safety, health, environment, innovation, and competition 
policy. 
 
Reflecting tensions prevalent in the Uruguay Round, some countries continued 
to sign the GATT agreements through the end of 1995, even as over 70 countries 
joined the WTO. However, from 128 GATT signatories, the initial WTO 
membership dropped to 74 countries and only reached the prior GATT numbers 
in 1998 (see figure 1). Membership subsequently grew more slowly, especially once 
Doha Round disputes made the benefits of joining less clear to the 39 countries 
recognized by the United Nations that had not joined the WTO. Summer, 2012]                       Epistemic Contests & Legitimacy of the WTO                               211 
 
Figure 1. GATT and WTO Cumulative Membership 
 
Source: Adapted from WTO, “WTO Membership”, 
http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
 
While the Uruguay Round agreements were hailed as a major breakthrough in 
the contentious history of trade negotiations, they also generated disputes between 
developed and developing countries and drew the attention of NGOs and activists. 
A group of developing countries sometimes called the ‘G-10 hardliners’ – led by 
Brazil and India – initially opposed the inclusion of services, intellectual property 
rights, and investment measures in trade talks.29 The final agreement ultimately 
hinged on a ‘grand bargain’ that differed from the traditional reciprocity of 
opening markets and lowering tariffs between countries for the same class of 
goods. The new deal held that OECD member countries would open their markets 
to agricultural and labour-intensive manufactured goods, including foodstuffs and 
clothing; in exchange, developing countries would enforce intellectual property and 
open financial markets to outside investors.  
 
But the grand bargain also reinforced divisions between developed and 
developing nations that proved significant to the WTO’s legitimacy. Developing 
countries argued that the WTO negotiating process was biased in favour of rich 
countries and resented pressure to sign the Uruguay deal. Subsequent WTO 
meetings grew acrimonious. The 1999 Seattle meeting featured thousands of 
                                                 
29 CHAD P. BOWN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 22-44 Brookings Institution Press 2009) [hereinafter BOWN]. 
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protesters on the streets, violent clashes with police, and vociferous disputes in 
meeting rooms. It ended with a walkout by delegates from most developing 
countries.30  In a stinging rebuke of the view that WTO agreements allowed a 
managed transition to free trade and would promote general prosperity, protesters 
characterized the WTO as “the most effective anti-democratic institution on 
earth”.31 While adopting a more moderate tone, representatives from developing 
countries – comprising the majority of new WTO membership – found that the 
institution operated with tacit rules. Negotiating rounds involved large sessions, 
but key decisions were made in smaller working groups dominated by the largest 
economies. Expecting a more open and democratic process, numerous countries 
raised the issue of how the WTO could claim to speak for all members when many 
felt coerced into joining by the necessity of belonging to the international trading 
system.32 
 
B.  The Doha Round 
 
Nevertheless, at the fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in 
November 2001, WTO members agreed to launch a new negotiation round. 
Formally, the talks were called the “Doha Development Agenda”, rather than a 
new “Round”. Fundamental differences immediately emerged concerning 
agricultural subsidies and intellectual property rights that were not easily resolved, 
even under the rubric of development. Talks at Doha concluded with a 10-page 
declaration that reaffirmed member states’ rights to regulate domestically, notably 
environment, labour, and services. 33  It also outlined technical assistance and 
capacity building initiatives for developing countries.34 Delegates  announced  a 
“work programme” of negotiations on agriculture, services, intellectual property, 
international investment, competition policy, government procurement, and WTO 
governance.35 
 
Meetings in Cancún in September 2003 revealed a hardening of positions on 
                                                 
30 Sylvia Ostry, The World Trading System: In the Fog of Uncertainty, 1 REV. INT’L ORG. 139 
(2006). 
31 John Passacantando, Dark Power of the WTO, DENV. POST, Nov. 20, 1991, at B11. 
32 Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach, 
in  POWER IN GLOBAL  GOVERNANCE 130 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2005); Bhupinder Chimni, The WTO, Democracy, and Development: A 
View from the South, in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT 
261 (Carolyn Birkbeck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). 
33   World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/ 
mindecl_e.htm.  
34 Id. 
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agricultural subsidies, intellectual property rights, and four “Singapore” issues 
(named for the first WTO ministerial conference held in Singapore in 1996), 
namely international investment, competition policy, government procurement, 
and trade facilitation.36 Capital flows and investment were particularly contentious 
in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The Cancún meeting also featured a 
recalibration of North - South relations in WTO negotiations. For example, 
Zimbabwe’s Ambassador Chidyausiku spoke for many developing countries when 
he observed: “In Doha, they created a process where Ministers could go to the 
Committee of the Whole and discuss and raise issues, but nobody was taking into 
account what they said … In fact, there was a smaller group taking the decisions 
for the whole.”37 A WTO G-20 was forged among developing countries, led by 
Brazil, China, and India, which agreed to negotiate as a unified bloc. Representing 
70% of the world’s rural population, the G-20 criticized efforts by the United 
States and the European Union to continue domestic farm subsidies and 
agricultural export supports. At the same time, some members, notably India, 
objected to cutting tariffs on imported agricultural products, and four West 
African countries sought a specific agreement on ending cotton subsidies in the 
United States.38 The Cancún meeting ended in disarray. North - South tensions 
continued unabated in follow-up meetings, despite an agreement to drop the 
Singapore issues from negotiations. 
 
Nevertheless, by 2012 the WTO’s leadership celebrated the breadth of 
membership and deliberative sequence of Doha Round discussions. Writing in a 
blog, WTO director-general Pascal Lamy observed that the tenor had changed as 
the WTO ceased integrating new members and began to hold negotiations 
exclusively in Geneva. Reflecting on a 2010 meeting, he stated: “There were no 
surprises. It was not a big jamboree, with thousands of journalists, hugely costly 
arrangements and sleepless nights. But a feeling of normality, a feeling that the 
WTO is a solid institution. This conference was more like a shareholders meeting 
to review annual activities and priorities.”39 Yet, the calm that Lamy celebrated was 
of an institution on a plateau. Membership had levelled off at 153 countries. 
Developed countries were seeking greater access to high-growth markets in 
middle-income countries for financial services, medicines, entertainment, and 
agricultural goods. But poorer nations had limited options for agricultural and 
                                                 
36 Melaku Desta, The Bumpy Ride Towards the Establishment of “A Fair and Market-Oriented 
Agricultural Trading System” at the WTO: Reflections following the Cancun Setback, 8 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 489 (2003). 
37 AILEEN KWA, POWER POLITICS IN THE WTO 26 (Focus on the Global South 2003) 
[hereinafter KWA]. 
38 The WTO Under Fire, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2003, at 26-28. 
39 Pascal Lamy, Pascal Lamy’s Ministerial Conference Blog (Dec. 2, 2010), WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION,    http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min09_e/ 
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manufactured exports, and commonly were dependent on a small number of 
purchasers locked in through bilateral agreements. A Doha Round compromise 
could expand trade globally, yet fundamental differences on domestic subsidies 
and other non-tariff issues meant that few proposals for compromise were 
emerging from either side. 
 
For decades, first GATT and then the WTO derived legitimacy from 
demonstrating the network effects of membership. By joining, countries could 
access larger markets for exports and engage in trade negotiations in a more 
balanced forum than found in many bilateral settings. However, as the Doha 
Round began, developing countries challenged WTO negotiations as biased in 
favour of rich country interests and therefore lacking legitimacy. The creation of a 
WTO G-20 by rising middle-income nations shifted negotiations from intellectual 
property enforcement and capital flow liberalization (of concern to the United 
States and European Union) to agriculture. However, with membership growth 
stalled and negotiation meetings breaking down in acrimony, the WTO’s legitimacy 
as the peak organization for trade discussions came under more sustained attack 
than in the past, and trade negotiations independent of the WTO framework 
became attractive to many countries. 
 
C.  Balancing Dispute Filings 
 
Whereas GATT relied on the agreement of all members (including the 
offending country) to levy sanctions, the Uruguay Round accords established the 
DSB with power to rule on trade disputes, monitor implementation, and authorize 
retaliation if countries failed to comply.40According to numerous studies, disputes 
filed under GATT and the DSB in its early years were resolved primarily through 
negotiated settlements, largely to the benefit of developed country complainants.41 
Developing countries settled early and for less advantageous outcomes than were 
possible.42 Critics argued that the DSB was biased against developing countries.43 
However, it was unclear whether the bias stemmed from an explicit preference for 
                                                 
40 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].  
41 GREGORY SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN 
WTO  LITIGATION Brookings Institution Press 2003); Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM 
INT’L L. J. 158 (2000). 
42 Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719 (2003).  
43 KWA, supra note 37; for additional analysis of critics of the WTO, see Gregory 
Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries, Int’l Ctr. 
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rich country interests, unequal access to the financial, econometric, and legal 
resources necessary to bring and sustain a dispute, or peculiarities of the cases 
brought in the late 1990s and early 2000s. For the WTO, however, perception of 
bias in the dispute process by the mid-2000s posed the threat that countries would 
not enforce decisions or that suits would be brought by only a few participants in 
the international system. 
 
In the DSB’s early years, the United States and European countries filed most 
claims, both against one another and against developing countries (see figure 2). By 
the latter half of the 2000s, new complaints were on a more even footing, primarily 
because developed countries were filing fewer disputes against one another or 
against developing countries. As a percentage of new disputes initiated, complaints 
by developing countries against developed nations shifted from 16 percent in the 
five years starting in 1995 to over 30 percent subsequently. Critics nevertheless, 
have continued to attack the WTO as lacking legitimacy, partly because of cost and 
legal and technical expertise barriers faced by developing countries seeking to file 
disputes and partly for delayed compliance by rich-world countries to unfavourable 
rulings. 
 
Figure 2. WTO Disputes Initiated 
 
Source: Adapted from WTO, “Dispute Settlement: The Disputes”, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm 
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An analysis of 424 disputes filed since the formal creation of the WTO in 1995 
reveals a balancing of dispute filings and panel rulings over the course of the past 
16 years. To better understand this shift I created a data set from WTO sources 
encompassing 424 disputes completed or underway as of late 2011. Disputes were 
categorized by complainants (developed versus developing country, using OECD 
definitions) and by DSB rulings, including by appellate panels and arbitrators. Of 
the WTO dispute cases initiated since the Uruguay Round agreement was signed, 
nearly 60 percent have achieved a clear resolution in one of three ways: a panel 
ruling by the DSB with enforcement by the winning party, a mutually agreed 
settlement, or withdrawal of the dispute by the complainant. A win or loss was 
determined by reading panel, appellate, and arbitrator reports. For the majority of 
cases that reached a final ruling, outcomes were clear. In other cases, decisions 
were coded based on the preponderance of DSB rulings. If a claimant won 75 
percent or more of their arguments or if the defendant conceded to 75 percent or 
more of the dispute by agreeing to implement DSB recommendations, the case 
was coded as a win. Cases also were coded as wins for the complainant if 
withdrawn prior to final ruling because the defendant removed the domestic 
policies in question. For a small number of cases under a second round of appeals 
(1 percent of the total), wins or losses were coded based on the preponderance of 
the previous two rulings since DSB panels are unlikely to reverse two prior rulings. 
For mutually agreed outcomes, cases were coded as wins for complainants if the 
compromise required the losing side to make domestic policy changes (e.g., by 
removing tariffs or eliminating subsidies). Cases characterized by the WTO as 
mutually agreed solutions that did not describe the exact settlement were dropped 
from the analysis. Withdrawn disputes that were the result of the defendant 
removing the policy in question were coded as wins for the complainant. The 
remaining 40 percent of cases are presently in consultation (32 percent), awaiting 
creation of a panel (5 percent), or are under review by constituted panels (3 
percent). Seven cases are in limbo since the terms of their DSB panels expired; 
these were not included in the analysis. 
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Figure 3.  Cumulative WTO Dispute Rulings 
 
Source: Adapted from WTO, “Dispute Settlement: The Disputes”, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm 
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Figure 4.  Balancing WTO Dispute Outcomes 
 
 
Source: Adapted from WTO, “Dispute Settlement: The Disputes”, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm 
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case analyzed below demonstrates, DSB decisions sometimes encountered 
significant resistance when they went against the interests of major powers. 
 
IV. LEGITIMACY THROUGH DISPUTE ADJUDICATION 
 
As a direct consequence of the DSB’s growing role, juridical legitimacy became 
critical for the WTO. Dilemmas emerged in which experts, selected for training 
and knowledge rather than for their representation of national or specific industry 
sector interests, determined technical issues which had deep political and economic 
ramifications. In areas ranging across the international effects of domestic 
subsidies, the environmental effects of trade, and the labelling of foods, policy 
choices were recast as scientific and technical questions to be solved by experts.44 
While this “technical turn” helped to limit challenges to the credibility of panel 
members and the DSB as a ruling body, it made claims for the democratic 
legitimacy of the WTO more difficult to sustain. Furthermore, by taking on a 
juridical role, the WTO deepened its organizational role in the global system. A 
body of common law thus emerged for international trade in the form of rulings 
written in a rational, neutral, and technical-legal language, including citations to 
previous decisions and references to economic and scientific principles.45 
 
To analyze the implications of epistemic contests for the WTO that have 
arisen in the course of this shift to more technical adjudication and the writing of 
common law governing trade, this section focuses on the Agreement on 
Agriculture and the US-Upland Cotton dispute between Brazil and the United 
States.46  I find that the AoA appeared largely unenforceable when the United 
States and European Union delayed and in some cases violated its core tenets. 
However, research into the cotton dispute demonstrates that once Brazil invested 
considerable resources to advance the dispute, it could draw upon a narrow legal 
interpretation of the AoA to win a major DSB ruling. At the same time, and of 
significance for the future of the WTO, technical issues with broader policy 
ramifications emerged, as dispute settlement panelists engaged with an 
econometric model used to quantify market distortions and costs to farmers from 
U.S. agricultural subsidies. I argue that the dispute shifted sequentially from 
technical questions concerning cotton supply and demand elasticity to the 
existence of a world market and single price for cotton to questions of access to 
econometric models and protected information about farms and farmers. 
                                                 
44 BOWN, supra note 29. 
45 Surya Subedi, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a New Technique for Settling Disputes 
in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: NEW PROBLEMS 
AND TECHNIQUES 173 (Duncan French et. al. eds., Hart Publishing 2010). 
46 United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, DS267 (General reference to the WTO 
dispute), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm. 220                                          Trade, Law and Development                                             [Vol. 4: 200 
Understanding this sequence is of significance also for future epistemic contests 
that will arise at the DSB. 
 
A. Agriculture  and  Trade 
 
Under the 1947 GATT agreement, tariffs on industrial and agricultural 
products were to be lowered together. In practice, successive negotiation rounds 
excluded agriculture in order to achieve consensus on other tariff reductions. A 
breakthrough came in the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture47, part of the Uruguay 
Round agreements. Under the AoA, countries had set schedules to follow when 
reducing subsidies and tariffs. With the launch of the Doha Round, export 
subsidies were to be “phased out”, not just reduced. The United States, European 
Union, and most other OECD countries agreed to sort domestic support into 
three conceptual “boxes”: a permissible green box, a transitional blue box, and an 
amber box set for reduction. Green box policies were believed to have minimal 
effects on production and trade; these included conservation programs, scientific 
research, and nutrition programs such as food stamps. Amber box policies had 
direct effects on production and trade; they were to be reduced over time from 
baseline levels. Policies labelled amber varied by economic development level, but 
broadly included counter-cyclical payments, direct price supports by volume of 
harvested crop, and government-subsidized loans to farmers or crop purchasers. 
The blue box was believed by developing countries to be a short-term transition 
mechanism, but proved controversial when the European Union and United States 
sought to use it to postpone major changes to domestic subsidies.48 
 
While some parties believed the longer-term ambition of the AoA was to 
completely eliminate production and export subsidies, the agreement itself called 
only for their reduction through three key provisions. First, it gave countries 6 
years from January 1, 1995 (10 years for developing countries)49, to implement the 
agreement.50  Second, “special safeguard” provisions allowed countries to raise 
tariffs temporarily if import volumes spiked or if the price of imports dropped 
suddenly.51Third, a “peace clause” in article 13 stated that countries would exercise 
“restraint” from initiating WTO disputes or introducing countervailing duties 
based on other GATT or WTO agreements until the end of 2003.52The United 
                                                 
47 See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 [hereinafter AOA].  
48  MELAKU  DESTA,  THE  LAW OF INTERNATIONAL  TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS: FROM GATT 1947 TO THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE (Kluwer 
Int’l 2002). 
49 See AOA art. 15(2). 
50 See AOA art. 1(f). 
51 See AOA art. 5. 
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States and European Union interpreted this clause to provide immunity from 
dispute claims so long as they demonstrated progress toward AoA commitments.53 
 
B.  Brazil and the WTO 
 
As the Uruguay Round agreements came into effect, several developing 
countries created explicit WTO negotiation strategies and a few focused on the 
dispute process.54In particular, Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) 
took a leading role in WTO negotiations. Lula’s approach contrasted with that of 
his predecessor, Fernando Cardoso, who had led Brazil’s accession to the WTO in 
1995 as part of an economic liberalization strategy. 
 
Prior to Lula’s presidency, the Brazilian government had set up an office for 
the General Coordination of Disputes (Coordenação Geral de Contenciosos, or 
CGC) within the foreign ministry. CGC was created in response to the domestic 
view that the government did not sufficiently understand the emerging rules for 
international trade and was doing a poor job of representing Brazilian interests 
internationally. This perception was exacerbated over the course of four high-
profile WTO disputes between Canada and Brazil concerning subsidies to the 
airplane manufacturers Embraer and Bombardier. 55   After Lula began his 
presidency in 2003, the CDC’s role was strengthened. Brazil’s agricultural ministry 
also grew increasingly aware of arguments by economists concerning the 
distortionary effects of U.S. and EU subsidies. Officials at CGC and Brazil’s 
agricultural ministry then began to consider test cases against both the United 
States and the European Union to hold them accountable to WTO commitments. 
For the United States, Brazil’s initial focus was on soybean subsidies; for the 
European Union, the focus was on sugar subsidies.56 
                                                 
53 WTO Secretariat, WTO AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS: THE ISSUES, AND WHERE 
WE  ARE  NOW (2004), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agnegs_bkgrnd 
_e.pdf; RANDY SCHNEPF & CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22927, 
WTO DOHA ROUND: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE (Jan. 4, 2010). 
54 Notable WTO complainant countries in the 2000s included Brazil (26 complaints), 
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Brazil’s policymakers turned their attention from soy to cotton after 
participating in conferences of the International Cotton Advisory Committee 
[ICAC] and reading studies by Oxfam International and other organizations in the 
early 2000s.57 Cotton prices had dropped by 40 percent between December 2000 
and May 2002. While the decline was partly blamed on the 2001 recession, 
numerous studies identified countercyclical payments by the U.S. government as a 
major culprit.58 Even economists at the World Bank took notice of some $4 billion 
in U.S. cotton subsidies in 2002, a year in which the world cotton market was 
estimated at $20 billion.59 At an ICAC conference that year, several economists 
extrapolated from the U.S. government, data on subsidies and output to quantify 
how much cotton would have been produced if not for the policies under 
question. They held that U.S. production would have declined by between 900,000 
and 1.4 million tons in the years 1999-2002, with world cotton prices higher by 
between 6 and 22 cents.60 In the interim, soybean prices were rising internationally 
thanks to the strong domestic demand in China; as a consequence, U.S. subsidies 
to soybean farmers declined and a WTO case looked weak.61 
 
C.  Brazil – United States Cotton Dispute 
 
Agricultural subsidies in Brazil were modest, averaging below 6 percent of 
total farm income, compared with 12 percent in the United States and 29 percent 
in the European Union. 62   The primary route for government assistance to 
agriculture was through research and large-scale soil improvement programs 
spearheaded by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa 
Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, or Embrapa). Over the course of the 1980s 
and 1990s, Embrapa’s programs added phosphorus and lime to improve the soil in 
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Brazil’s vast cerrado (savannah), developed strains of commodity crops that 
prospered in the Brazilian climate, and helped underwrite the uptake of new 
machinery and farming technologies.63Cotton farming in Brazil shifted from south-
eastern states to the large interior states of Mato Grosso and Goias, and yields 
improved from below 200 kilograms per hectare (kg/ha) in the 1980s to a world-
leading 1,450 kg/ha by 2009 (cotton yields in the United States averaged 920 
kg/ha).64 
 
In 1999, growers from Mato Grosso took the lead in setting up a new trade 
association, the Brazilian Association of Cotton Producers (Associação Brasileira 
dos Produtores de Algodão, or Abrapa). Abrapa quickly began to develop 
expertise on WTO agreements and hired legal representation to assist in preparing 
a case against the United States. Members also began to pool resources; from an 
initial estimate of approximately $200,000 that Abrapa would need to contribute to 
a WTO dispute, spending eventually grew to nearly $3.5 million over the course of 
eight years.65  While the Brazilian foreign ministry’s CGC department took the 
official lead in the eventual cotton dispute, Abrapa remained involved throughout 
by providing data on Brazilian cotton production and by underwriting some of the 
legal fees and costs of hiring agricultural economists and other experts. 
 
The Brazilian government proceeded to file a complaint against U.S. cotton 
subsidies on September 27, 2002. After consultations with the United States 
following the official complaint failed to reach a resolution, the Brazilian 
government initiated an official dispute, with a DSB panel announced in March 
2003. Under WTO rules, the DSB panel was composed with three members: 
Dariusz Rosati, an academic economist and Poland’s foreign minister for several 
years in the mid-1990s; Mario Matus, a member of Chile’s foreign ministry 
specializing in bilateral trade issues; and Daniel Moulis, a private-sector lawyer 
from Australia. 
 
Brazil’s case was based on four claims concerning U.S. government programs 
that allegedly violated the AoA and created “serious injury” to Brazilian cotton 
exporters. First, Brazil argued that U.S. cotton subsidies, which under the AoA 
were supposed to decline from a 1992 benchmark, had instead increased.66 In 
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2000, a year of low cotton prices, American cotton producers received $4.6 billion 
in government aid; even as prices rose, U.S. growers averaged $3.5 billion from 
government programs, supplementing an average annual harvest value of $4.3 
billion.67 Second, Brazil claimed that production flexibility contract payments (in 
the 1996 farm bill) and direct payments (in the 2002 farm bill), both of which paid 
farmers not to plant fruits, vegetables, or wild rice, violated WTO provisions 
regarding trade-distorting subsidies.68 In effect, these aspects of the U.S. farm bill 
pushed farmers to grow even more cotton instead of considering other crops. 
Third, Brazil protested market loss assistance and so-called Step 2 payments, which 
compensated domestic mills and exporters for the price difference between U.S. 
cotton and the average of the five lowest foreign market prices for the year. 
Fourth, Brazil argued that export credit guarantees, which included loans to traders 
and subsidized credit to foreign banks for the purchase of U.S. agricultural 
products, violated the AoA.69  The overall effect, by Brazil’s calculation, was a 
global cotton price depressed by nearly 13 percent and there was a “serious 
prejudice” to the interests of Brazilian farmers, who lost nearly $480 million in 
direct revenues over the 1999-2002 growing seasons. Brazil claimed $600 million in 
total losses for 2001 alone, based on the total “lost revenue, lost production, losses 
of related services, lost federal and state revenue, higher unemployment and losses 
in Brazil’s trade balance”.70 
 
From the perspective of the United States, cotton was a rare bright spot 
compared to other declining exports. As domestic uses declined with a shift in 
clothing production to China and other Asian countries, U.S. cotton exports grew 
from 25 percent of the world market in the 1990s to 37 percent in the 2000s, 
earning $2.9 billion annually. Although cotton production accounted for just 0.03 
percent of U.S. GDP, it employed more than 150,000 people on 18,000 farms, 
with an estimated 200,000 additional jobs in textile mills, cottonseed oil 
production, and related businesses.71 
 
Responding to Brazil’s WTO complaint, the U.S. government invoked both 
technical and legal defences. First and foremost, the United States argued that the 
AoA’s peace clause granted signatory countries until 2004 to phase out domestic 
subsidies and export promotions. According to the United States, Article 13 of the 
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AoA superseded other agreements and Brazil’s dispute had no standing. Second, 
the United States explained that key programs under question, including 
production flexibility contracts and market loss assistance, had already expired by 
the time Brazil initiated the dispute. Since they no longer existed, it made little 
sense to have the DSB rule them illegal. Third, the United States argued that other 
subsidies were permissible under the AoA. These included direct payments made 
regardless of production volume or crop type, as well as support for cotton 
farmers that guaranteed a baseline income of 72.9 cents per pound of harvested 
crop.72 
 
American cotton farmers, concentrated in southern and Midwestern states, 
saw their livelihoods threatened by the WTO dispute and lobbied the U.S. 
Congress.73 They warned that the cotton market was inherently unstable without 
subsidies and price swings would hurt consumers. In the 2004 House Agricultural 
Committee hearings, Charles Stenholm, the ranking Democratic minority member 
and a Texas cotton farmer, claimed, “Brazil is the world’s eighth largest economy 
and yet calls itself a developing country. Despite its strength as an agricultural 
exporter, it deliberately subverted negotiations on agriculture in Cancún and seems 
to prefer litigation over negotiation.” Connecting cotton to broader global 
economic changes and the legitimacy of free trade policies to Americans, he 
warned, “The world [should] begin answering the question as to how long you 
believe the United States of America can keep buying $540 billion from you every 
year . . . without the law of economics taking over, or politics”.74 Robert Zoellick, 
U.S. trade representative for the Bush administration, testified, “I want to assure 
this committee . . . that we are going to fight to defend U.S. agricultural interests, 
regardless of the forum, whether it be litigation or negotiation”.75 
 
Divergent visions for the WTO were put forward alongside the legal and 
technical arguments. From Brazil’s perspective, absent reform to agricultural 
policies in the United States, the WTO risked losing legitimacy as a rule enforcer 
for international trade.76 Brazilian policymakers, especially at the CGC, hoped that 
the DSB offered an alternative to stalled multilateral negotiations as a way to 
enforce reforms. From the perspective of policymakers in the United States, 
however, the WTO was contributing to a dilemma in the political economy of free 
trade. In particular, as the United States reduced import tariffs, its trade balance 
suffered and entire sectors saw employment drop precipitously. Although 
arguments in congressional hearings regarding adherence to WTO rules were 
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disingenuous on their face, they pointed to a dominant domestic perception that 
the United States had led the world in advocating for free trade and had sacrificed 
manufacturing interests in favour of international economic growth. Rather than 
give the United States a break in agriculture, rising countries like Brazil now were 
demanding additional painful policy adjustments, through a judicial process 
dominated by non-U.S. interests. 
 
D.  Contesting the Cotton Model 
 
An econometric model used to quantify general market distortions and direct 
costs to Brazilian farmers from U.S. agricultural subsidies quickly became a focal 
point of the dispute. Dispute settlement panelists, none of whom had a 
background in agricultural economics, thus found themselves ruling on technical 
issues with broader policy ramifications. The dispute unfolded in three stages: first, 
a technical fight over cotton supply and demand elasticity; second, a dispute over 
the existence of a world “market” and “price” for cotton; and third, questions of 
access to the core model and protected information about farms and farmers. With 
some overlap, filings by the United States and responses by Brazil unfolded in a 
sequence that started with assumptions embedded in the model, then considered 
the relationship of the model to the real world, and then addressed deeper issues 
concerning the basis for econometric knowledge-claims.77 
 
In 2001, when Brazil’s cotton trade association and the foreign ministry’s trade 
dispute office grew aware of rising U.S. cotton subsidies, they contacted Daniel 
Sumner, an agricultural economist at the University of California, Davis. Sumner 
earned a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago and had worked for 
the USDA for over a decade, where he supervised economics and statistics 
departments. On behalf of Abrapa and CGC, Sumner employed a model 
developed at the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute [FAPRI], a joint 
program of Iowa State University and the University of Missouri-Columbia. With 
government funding, FAPRI develops multi-year projections for the U.S. 
agricultural sector and international commodity markets, “grounded in a series of 
assumptions about the general economy, agricultural policies, the weather, and 
technological change”. 78  Since its origins in 1984, FAPRI has developed and 
updated models for dairy, ethanol, grains, livestock, oilseeds, and sugar. Initially, 
the model was based on 171 equations; by 2004 it had expanded to over 800 
                                                 
77 Sociologists examining scientific disputes have identified a similar sequence when 
finding that closure is achieved through social and political mechanisms, not via additional 
experimentation.  See H ARRY  M.  COLLINS,  CHANGING  ORDER:  REPLICATION AND 
INDUCTION IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 90-96 (Sage 1985). 
78  FOOD  &  AGRIC.  POL’Y  RESEARCH  INST., ABOUT  FAPRI,
 http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/about.aspx. Summer, 2012]                       Epistemic Contests & Legitimacy of the WTO                               227 
 
equations that calculated biological and economic relationships within a particular 
commodity (e.g., corn acreage planted relative to corn prices) and among 
commodities (e.g., the relationship of dairy cow numbers to feed prices, or shifts in 
planted acreage of soybeans, wheat, or other crops relative to corn prices).79 
 
Sumner used the FAPRI model to develop “counterfactual scenarios” for 
global cotton output, consumption, and prices with and without major U.S. 
subsidy programs.80 To account for delays between planting and harvesting (and 
shipping to international markets), he introduced a one-year time lag between 
subsidy and market impact. Sumner carried out a sequence of steps: first, 
modelling the supply effects of removing each of the subsidies; second, putting the 
changed U.S. supply (which shrank in the absence of subsidies) into a simulation 
model of global cotton supply and demand; and third, calculating rising world 
market prices (a consequence of reduced U.S. production), modelling the response 
by suppliers in other countries, and figuring in the resulting mitigation of price 
increases. For cotton specifically, the FAPRI model measured demand based on 
domestic data from a variety of purchasers, notably cotton mills. To resolve 
missing data, Sumner’s estimates included an adjustment – a residual equal to 
world exports minus world imports – that ensured world demand equalled world 
supply. Sumner’s adjustment was the same as a longstanding FAPRI method of 
determining the market-clearing price for any particular commodity by setting 
supplies to equal demand. Of importance in the WTO dispute, the FAPRI model 
did not use U.S. exports as an input measure to generate supply-side changes, but 
instead calculated them as the difference between domestic production and 
domestic consumption. Sumner reported his findings to Brazilian officials, who 
cited them directly in WTO filings. 
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Table 1. Elasticity Calculations at the Centre of the Brazil – United States Cotton Dispute 
 
Parameter  Brazil’s WTO Claim United States FAPRI 
Elasticity 
U.S. cotton supply elasticity 0.80 0.21
Rest of World cotton supply 
elasticity 
0.20 0.33
U.S. cotton demand elasticity -0.20 -0.82
Rest of World cotton demand 
elasticity 
-0.20 -0.39
Source: WTO, “United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton: Recourse to Arbitration by the United 
States”, WT/DS267/ARB/2 (August 31, 2009), at 41 
 
In December 2003, nine months after the DSB panel was established, the U.S. 
government presented alternative supply and demand elasticity figures to the WTO 
(see Table 1).81The U.S. government relied on economists at the USDA and Bruce 
Babcock, an agricultural economist at the Iowa State University Centre for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, for technical arguments. Both sides 
calculated supply elasticity in the same way, namely as a ratio of the percentage 
change in acreage planted to the percentage change in price. Under Sumner’s 
calculations on behalf of Brazil, farmers in the United States would plant 8 percent 
more acreage if the price increased by 10 percent. He arrived at this figure by first 
incrementally removing each of the six contested subsidy programs and calculating 
the subsequent decrease in planted area, production, and subsequent exports. In a 
second step, he derived the supply elasticity from producers’ responses to the 
subsidy programs. U.S. farmers, in Brazil’s arguments to the WTO, reacted 
strongly in the short-term to announcements of new subsidies or to their removal. 
Farmers in the rest of the world, by contrast, did not receive subsidies and instead 
responded directly to market signals. According to Brazil’s claim, farmers 
worldwide reacted in the opposite direction from U.S. farmers to the “shocks” 
induced by the contested subsidy programs.82 
 
The United States countered that Sumner’s values were too high, considering 
that many of the USDA subsidies were of short-term duration and not announced 
far enough in advance to shift production significantly.83  While conceding that 
farmers would adjust crop output based on price changes over the long term, the 
United States argued that in the short term, the supply elasticity was far smaller. 
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Turning to specific subsidies, the United States defended decoupled payments, 
crop insurance, and export credits as having a far lower effect (or none at all) on 
farm production. The U.S. government also calculated that farmers in other 
countries had higher supply elasticity than in Brazil’s claim, based on modelling 
domestic farmer responses to subsidies and then anticipating how farmers 
elsewhere responded to the new equilibrium point. The proper question for 
analysis, according to the United States, was the price of cotton in the absence of 
subsidies, not how producers would react before the equilibrium point was 
reached. 
 
Disagreement over demand elasticity followed directly from questions of how 
farmers respond to price signals. Under Sumner’s model, worldwide cotton 
demand would drop by 2 percent for each 10 percent price increase.84Brazil 
identified several specific subsidy programs that reduced the net price paid by 
buyers of U.S. cotton and therefore influenced demand. At the same time, Brazil 
claimed that end consumers, who were not especially sensitive to the price of raw 
cotton, were the primary determinants of cotton demand. The United States, by 
contrast, argued that demand varied considerably around the world and 
independent of subsidy programs. U.S. cotton mills, the primary purchasers, were 
sensitive to even small moves in price. At the same time, the rest of the world – 
dominated by China and other east and south-east Asian clothing producers – was 
less price sensitive. Nevertheless, the U.S. model estimated demand response at 
nearly double that of Sumner’s analysis. Without explicitly arguing the point, the 
United States implied that price volatility was the most important risk posed to 
cotton growers. By reducing volatility through subsidies, the United States was 
contributing to lower demand variation. Manufacturers could then plan on longer 
time frames, to the benefit of the farmers that produced cotton. 
 
Overall, according to U.S. filings to the WTO, Brazil’s claims exaggerated the 
effects of U.S. agricultural policies. In the real world, supply and demand curves 
were slower to equilibrate in response to subsidy programs. While not disputing 
the rational actor underlying the FAPRI model, the United States was in effect 
arguing that Brazil believed in an unrealistically fast response by farmers to market 
forces. The United States’ calculations for low domestic supply elasticity but large 
demand elasticity together supported its argument that subsidies were not 
distorting world markets. Likewise, calculations of a higher supply elasticity and 
larger demand elasticity in the rest of the world relative to Brazil’s figures 
reinforced the argument that U.S. subsidies had little effect on international prices 
and therefore did not hurt cotton growers in Brazil. When rebutting the U.S. 
arguments, Brazil asserted that considering only long-run equilibrium points would 
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ignore large adverse effects caused throughout the adjustment process.85 Rather 
than wait for a final outcome, the WTO should weigh farmer and consumer 
behaviours from the time subsidies were put into place. 
 
Sumner’s views on subsidies, which were central to Brazil’s arguments to the 
WTO, thus contrasted with those of his former colleagues at the USDA and the 
U.S. government more generally. He later expounded on the issue at greater length 
in a review essay of the agricultural economics literature. 86  Historically, 
observational and empirical studies had led economists to support subsidies as a 
solution to the classic “farm problem” of seasonal variability in prices and the risks 
posed by crop failure. According to Sumner, by the 1980s most academic 
economists considered a variety of market-based hedging and other financial 
instruments as less distortionary to the economy, sufficient to address seasonal 
price variability, and a way to reduce the costs of crop failure for farmers and 
consumers.87 Yet commodity price spikes and crashes continued and remained a 
topic of dispute, with economists and policymakers divided between supporters 
and opponents of subsidies. Arguments concerning the relationship of subsidies to 
crop price variability that remained unresolved after decades of observational and 
modelling research in the economics discipline thus confronted DSB panel 
members responsible for the cotton dispute. 
 
The DSB panel worked to make sense of the underlying economic arguments 
put forth by Brazil and the United States. Notably, the panel first sought to narrow 
the terms of dispute regarding supply and demand elasticity before articulating key 
decisions. Panelists thus held: “In the context of the argumentation of the parties, 
the concepts of short-run and long-run relate to the process of economic 
adjustment arising from the exogenous change in the economic environment.”88 
Turning to the cotton dispute specifically, the panel observed that exogenous 
factors were principally the presence or removal of U.S. subsidies. Noting the 
challenges facing farmers outside of the United States – especially information 
access and high switching costs among crops – the DSB panel ruled in favour of 
Brazil’s short-run elasticity:  
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Producers in the rest of the world are not able to immediately and fully 
profit from the increase in the world price of cotton … Using long-run 
elasticities, which assumes that all adjustments have been completed (or 
that there are no adjustment costs), will underestimate the adverse effects 
of the measures.89 
 
Brazil’s supply and demand elasticities thereupon became the basis for the panel’s 
rulings and the foundation for compensation claims. 
 
As a second line of defense, the U.S. government challenged how Brazil 
arrived at specific costs to Brazilian farmers and disputed calculations of a global 
price depression from U.S. subsidies. Adopting a somewhat post-modern 
argument, the United States suggested there was no such thing as a universal 
product, “cotton”, or a “world market” for cotton. Instead, cotton varied by 
quality and types of uses and every country had its own markets with price 
variation. Then the United States insisted that Brazil specify the “subsidized 
product” for each of the kinds of subsidies that were harming its domestic 
growers.90  Likewise, the United States argued that the AoA reference to price 
effects “in the same market” required Brazil to identify the “particular domestic 
market … in which price effects are alleged to have occurred”.91 The  panel 
ultimately consistently ruled against these arguments. When doing so, the panel 
members provided definitions of cotton based on USDA grading methods, cited 
dictionary or other common definitions of “price” and “price suppression”, and 
interpreted the AoA text on “same market” as distinct from any particular 
geographic area.92 
 
As a third tactic, the United States warned that Brazil’s WTO dispute claim 
“does not provide the model itself, including detailed specification of the equations 
therein. As a result, Brazil is essentially asking the Panel and the United States to 
accept Dr. Sumner’s results on faith alone”.93 In response, Brazil observed that the 
model was developed using U.S. government funding and the full “electronic 
version of the model was available for use by the United States Government upon 
coordination with FAPRI staff”.94 Aligned to the request for the model itself, the 
United States also argued that because Sumner had not retained the original 
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outputs of his work, it was impossible to evaluate his use of FAPRI.95 In  a 
sequence, potentially leading to repetitive circular arguments, the United States 
warned that its economists could not replicate Sumner’s findings and therefore 
could not fairly evaluate the price impacts claimed by Brazil. Disputing that 
Sumner’s work was even based on the FAPRI model, the United States further 
argued, “Dr. Sumner’s economic analysis cannot serve as a basis for any findings 
on the effect of challenged U.S. subsidies”.96 
 
The DSB issued an interim ruling late 2003 concerning access to the FAPRI 
model and the basis for Brazil’s quantitative claims.97 Panel  members  defined 
which data and analysis would be used to make decisions, thereby undermining 
attempts by the United States to create a loop in which key economic claims made 
by Brazil were weakened by questions about their empirical or epistemological 
foundations. Specifically, the DSB stated: “The Panel will assess the reliability and 
relevance of the FAPRI model on the basis of the evidence presented to it by the 
parties.” 98  Materials not filed in official briefs would not weigh on panelists’ 
decisions. At the same time, the panel expressed frustration concerning U.S. 
demands for access to the model, noting: “We say that the U.S. has all of the 
information (i.e., both the FAPRI model and Brazil’s information) … because 
Brazil itself has never had access to all of the data comprising the FAPRI model … 
FAPRI has made all of the information available to the U.S. Why it had done this 
in the case of the U.S., but not Brazil, relates to the relationship (commercial and 
otherwise) between FAPRI (which receives U.S. funding for its work) and the U.S. 
Government. FAPRI has provided all of the information to the U.S. on the 
express stipulation that the model not be provided to the Panel or Brazil.”99 Panel 
members thus avoided a potentially unsolvable dilemma for the WTO of 
defendants gaining the right to unpack every assumption underlying complex 
econometric models. While beneficial to Brazil’s claims, the WTO panel ironically 
narrowed FAPRI as a closed input - output model even as the parties to the 
dispute were opening it to critical inquiry. 
 
In a flurry of briefs, formal requests, and counter-arguments in December 
2003 and January 2004, questions of privacy and data access came to the fore even 
while both countries continued to dispute supply and demand elasticity. The 
United States requested additional proof of distortions caused by direct payments 
and counter-cyclical subsidies. In response, Brazil argued that it could do no better 
than macro estimates without farm-specific identifiers that would make it possible 
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to match payments to farms with subsequent harvest data. Brazil revealed that the 
USDA had provided such information for rice following a Freedom of 
Information Act request filed by one of its consultants. The United States, 
however, informed the DSB panel that rice data had been released in error and 
requested “Brazil and its agents return all copies of the erroneous rice release”.100 
By implication, any similar data for cotton was also considered private. The DSB 
thereupon requested that the United States release the information, allowing for 
privacy by assigning anonymous numbers to each farm. The Panel warned, “A 
refusal by the United States to provide the information as requested without an 
adequate explanation may lead to adverse inferences being drawn”.101 Responding 
to the panel, the U.S. government explained that releasing farm-specific planting 
information would violate the Privacy Act of 1974.102  Brazil rebutted with an 
alternative interpretation and case precedents within the United States concerning 
the Privacy Act before observing that under WTO accords, member states could 
not invoke domestic laws to avoid complying with the dispute process.103 
 
The U.S. strategy to demand the computer code and equations for Brazil’s 
econometric analysis – and access to underlying data that Brazil could not provide 
– ran into a roadblock as the WTO panel began to deny U.S. requests. Panel 
members called on experts hired by both parties to explain their simulations and 
present findings concerning the link between subsidies and general market 
distortions as well as specific costs to Brazilian cotton growers. When ruling on the 
specific issue of access to the model, the panel excoriated the United States for 
demanding that Brazil provide the FAPRI model to the U.S. government when 
Brazil did not have access to the underlying data, explanations of key assumptions, 
and details of formulas that made up the model. While the ruling adopted 
measured tones, the panel was clearly irritated by the sequence:  
 
While Brazil instructed the organization which owned and operated the 
model (FAPRI) as to the modifications and adaptions that Brazil 
believed needed to be made to produce the econometric results 
presented to the Panel, Brazil could not itself autonomously check the 
use of those modifications and adaptions. When the United States asked 
to be able to analyze the model and its workings, FAPRI stipulated that 
neither Brazil nor the Panel could have similar access.104 
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Overall, the panel report emphasized “procedural fairness between the parties” 
even as the panel members sought to avoid criticism of their own lack of 
experience with agricultural econometric modelling: “we observe that the 
simulations were prepared by experts and explained to the panel by experts.”105 
 
Both parties to the dispute thus invested considerable resources into 
deconstructing one another’s claims, first disputing assumptions about supply and 
demand elasticity, then debating the conceptual basis for considering international 
markets to be real, and finally engaging in tit-for-tat demands about access to 
underlying data. As a consequence, the FAPRI model itself was opened to critical 
scrutiny. Furthermore, as experts were called to testify, the basis for their claims on 
behalf of Brazil or the United States were probed, i.e., whether an empirical 
observation or a probabilistic forecast could be based on an econometric model. 
On the other hand, certain issues were deemed out of bounds to the dispute. For 
example, the background and composition of the panel itself was not raised as a 
concern by the United States or Brazil. Likewise, the disciplinary training, 
publication records, and work experience of the experts who testified to the panel 
were not challenged in order to undermine their credibility. Nevertheless, the 
cotton dispute came to hinge upon a set of unobservable counterfactuals as 
modelled by Brazil and the United States. What appeared to be technical questions 
of supply and demand elasticity were also deeply political choices about agricultural 
subsidies in the United States and the relationship of domestic laws governing data 
access to the international adjudicatory role of the WTO.  
 
E.  Rulings, Appeals, and Closure 
 
The dispute panel issued a wide-ranging but detailed 351-page ruling in 
September 2004, finding generally that U.S. cotton policies had “result[ed] in 
serious prejudice to Brazil’s interests in the form of price suppression in the world 
market”.106 Significantly, the panel held that the AoA peace clause did not preclude 
the WTO from considering Brazil’s claims against the United States under other 
GATT agreements. The panel therefore ruled: “The issue of fulfilment of the 
conditions of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture is to be resolved using 
generally applicable DSU [Dispute Settlement Understanding] rules and 
procedures.”107 Having established their standing, panel members found that none 
of the U.S. domestic support programs cited by Brazil were protected by the peace 
clause and that all fell under the purview of the AoA.108 Next, the DSB held that 
even expired programs were eligible for claims concerning distortionary price 
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impacts during their duration.109 The panel report especially singled out production 
flexibility contract payments and direct payments as violating WTO “green box” 
subsidies. Furthermore, most of the export credit guarantees and the Step 2 
payments were declared export subsidies in violation of the AoA. The panel report 
concluded that the United States must “bring its measures … into conformity with 
the Agreement on Agriculture”, including the removal of subsidies within six 
months.110 
 
After the United States appealed the DSB panel ruling, an appellate body held 
in 2005 that price-contingent subsidies (marketing payments, market loss 
payments, and countercyclical payments) acted to suppress international prices and 
that domestic support measures, including production flexibility contracts and 
direct payments, violated the AoA. The appellate body also found that export 
credit guarantee programs were not exempt from the AoA. The ruling included 
specific deadlines for the removal or modification of U.S. subsidies. Despite 
several changes by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 2005 and 2006, notably 
elimination of Step 2 payments, Brazil requested evaluation by a WTO compliance 
panel. According to Brazil’s analysis, the United States continued to provide 
subsidies to cotton producers worth $3 billion annually. The WTO’s compliance 
panel ruled in December 2007 that the United States had acted inconsistently to 
phase out prohibited subsidies and countervailing measures.111 
 
Following another round of appeals regarding U.S. compliance with the 2004 
panel ruling, WTO arbitrators ruled in August 2009 that Brazil could impose 
$147.3 million in countermeasures annually, reduced from Brazil’s request for 
$1.037 billion.112 Demonstrating the significance of the dispute over supply and 
demand elasticity, arbitrators used Brazil’s figures to calculate the global adverse 
effects of U.S. subsidies and apportioned Brazil’s retaliation to its 5.1 % share of 
world cotton production.113  For only the second time in its history, the WTO 
approved cross-sector retaliation, including on intellectual property and services.114 
After domestic consultations, Brazil’s foreign trade office, (Câmara de Comércio 
Exterior, or CAMEX), published a list of 102 products imported from the United 
States that would face higher tariffs, including cotton, pharmaceuticals, 
automobiles, and electronics. In mid-March 2010, CAMEX also proposed 
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intellectual property retaliation measures: shortening patent and copyright terms on 
movies, software, and pharmaceuticals and other chemicals; permitting Brazilian 
firms to use intellectual property without the patent holder’s consent or 
remuneration; suspending laws prohibiting importation of infringing products; and 
creating a special intellectual property registration tax. 115 The move was 
controversial, even within Brazil, where some firms worried that it would set a 
precedent for weaker patent enforcement.116 
 
Facing the combined threat of higher tariffs on exports and undermining of 
intellectual property, the Obama administration sought a negotiated solution. In 
June 2010, the U.S. government signed an agreement to provide $147.3 million 
annually as technical assistance to Brazil’s cotton sector while pledging to avoid 
trade-distorting cotton subsidies in the next farm bill.117 After eight years of WTO 
adjudication, Brazil could claim success. Brazil’s trade minister, Miguel Jorge, 
explained: “The dispute helped the WTO system, since it demonstrated that 
developing countries can win if they have a properly prepared case.”118 By early 
2011, the Brazilian cotton industry had established a new organization, the 
Instituto Brasileiro do Algodão, to manage the largest international compensation 
payments in WTO history. As the 2012 farm bill entered congressional hearings, 
U.S. representatives were in regular communication with the government of Brazil. 
 
The WTO has long confronted a challenge to its legitimacy from the 
perception that it serves the interests of the United States and European countries 
over those of poorer developing nations. 119   Through the DSB’s expanding 
procedural and juridical function, the institution of free trade gained stability 
during the 2000s, even as other aspects of trade negotiations stalled. In effect, the 
WTO is building a body of common law through cumulative rulings and 
institutional order through DSB panel proceedings. In the case of the cotton 
dispute and the significant precedent it created, the world’s leading agricultural 
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power was bound by rules it helped to write. In Brazil, the outcome was reported 
as a strategic victory of a long-term investment in the WTO dispute process and an 
economic victory for agri-business. In the United States, the cotton dispute 
perhaps unavoidably played into the hands of critics of multilateralism and 
weakened the WTO’s popular standing. A television advertisement by the 
American Association of Retired Persons [AARP] in mid-2011thus held, “If 
Congress really wants to balance the budget, they could stop spending our money 
on things like a cotton institute in Brazil”.120 Nevertheless, confronted with either 
adhering to the DSB’s rulings or abdicating on deep WTO commitments, the 
United States made domestically controversial commitments to reform agricultural 
policy. 
 
Underpinning the visible power struggles that attract press, politician, and 
much scholarly attention, a subtler epistemic dispute played out in the Brazil – 
Upland Cotton dispute. Seemingly uncontestable economic principles, for example 
that subsidies induce farmers to grow more cotton and therefore depress prices, 
were opened to dispute based on time horizons and complexities of international 
markets. From narrow technical questions of supply and demand elasticity, the 
dispute shifted to underlying econometric models and the sources and validity of 
original data. Closure to the dispute was achieved not through further research and 
more modelling, but through DSB decisions and international negotiations 
between the governments of Brazil and the United States. Yet even as the DSB 
seeks to adjudicate between different epistemic approaches that arise in disputes, it 
is part of an overall WTO project seeking greater legitimacy by balancing 
representation of developed and developing countries. These mandates fit together 
uncomfortably at best. 
 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
The idea that all nations will benefit from trade, primarily by specializing in 
areas of comparative advantage, has deep roots in political economy. Writing in 
Britain in the midst of the industrial revolution, David Ricardo argued that 
international trade would promote more efficient allocation of capital and labour 
and would generate gains to all trading partners through specialization. 121 
Contemporary economists have built on Ricardo’s theory as a positive description 
of the world, with analytical models focused to debates over the terms of trade, 
consumer preferences, and technology and industrial infrastructure in developed 
                                                 
120  AARP,  T e l l  W a s h i n g t o n :  S t o p  C u t s  t o  Medicare and Social Security, 
www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy. 
121 D. RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 77-93 (J. 
M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1911) (1817).  238                                          Trade, Law and Development                                             [Vol. 4: 200 
and developing countries. 122  At the same time, the WTO has undertaken a 
normative agenda of remaking the world into a global free trade zone. 
Interestingly, the WTO is not attempting to conceptualize the world as a single 
entity. Great heterogeneity – diversity of wealth and variation in the production of 
goods and services – are fundamental to the international trading system. But the 
WTO is reconfiguring people’s relationships to goods and services by facilitating 
trade and the consequent conversion of things and ideas into property, including 
ones previously gifted or kept local. Unsurprisingly, there has been considerable 
opposition from diverse parties and attendant challenges to the legitimacy of the 
WTO.  
 
Institutional legitimacy is fundamental to the current era of globalization. In 
light of a multi-year economic slowdown in the United States and the European 
Union, domestic dislocations from international trade and debates over industrial 
policy rank high on policy agendas. At the same time, developing countries 
continue to question delays in the removal of rich-world agricultural subsidies. 
Barriers to international capital mobility remain a point of contention on both 
sides. At the WTO, an important shift has taken place from the strategy of 
building organizational legitimacy through expanding membership to institutional 
deepening via the dispute process. As trade disputes grew in significance during the 
2000s, a rebalancing of rulings occurred with greater numerical equality between 
developed and developing countries. Yet, as the Brazil - U.S. cotton dispute vividly 
illustrates, decisions by the DSB reach deeply into national politics and the 
resulting contention will inevitably fuel further challenges to the WTO’s legitimacy.  
 
This article suggests that legitimacy is constructed over time. Rather than 
serving as a fixed metric against which performance is to be judged, legitimacy is 
better understood as arising out of the interactions among diverse communities 
who must accept, enact, and enforce the rulings of an organization like the WTO. 
In turn, novel international organizations are the visible face of underlying 
institutions like free trade that now affect communities and individuals worldwide. 
WTO rulings offer a salient set of case studies to examine issues of legitimacy and 
the exercise of rational power in the contemporary era. Panel reports extract 
arguments from both sides, cite individual scientific, technical, and economic 
experts, define technical terms and common phrases found in WTO agreements, 
and then announce precedent-setting rules. Written in a language of “we”, 
referring anonymously to the panelists and by implication to the broader WTO 
membership, rulings are crafted as a voice of reason amidst the divergent 
economic interests of disputing parties. Rulings play a distinctive functional role in 
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building the juridical authority of the DSB. As a result, I have argued, they also 
play a significant role in building legitimacy for the WTO. 
 
Associated with the dispute process, the WTO now faces challenges that arise 
from expert knowledge and testimony in adversarial judicial settings. Thought by 
the founders of the WTO to be inherently neutral and above challenge, experts 
instead are subject to dilemmas associated with bias, imperfect fits between the 
laboratory or an econometric model and the real world, and uncertainty. Once core 
assumptions are opened to critical scrutiny. A longstanding tenet in the sociology 
of knowledge holds that expert authority derives not just from individual technical 
savvyness and access to unique methods that unlock underlying principles or rules 
of nature, but also from processes of constrained scrutiny and the patrolling of 
disciplinary boundaries.123As dispute processes open up, otherwise closed, “black 
boxes” of econometric models, the WTO has become a key site for working out 
how knowledge claims will be formulated, framed, and validated on the 
international level.  
 
Modelling, from colonial maps to contemporary econometric forecasts, has a 
history of use and abuse by imperial powers.124 The WTO at its core seeks to 
structure trade negotiations so that deals are balanced, and to decide disputes so 
that rulings are not determined solely by the will of the most powerful but instead 
through procedures and reason. As a result, the WTO now operates as a 
gatekeeper of acceptable evidence. To maintain this role, it must determine what 
counts as a valid economic fact, and interpret the relationship of a model to reality. 
This implies a need to attend to the WTO’s own knowledge-making processes to 
ensure that they facilitate deliberation without losing credibility. To do so, WTO 
may soon be compelled to foster greater openness in the dispute adjudication 
process. A first step would be to accept more amicus briefs and perspectives from 
non-governmental organizations in the contentious cases. 
 
Perspectives developed here about legitimacy and the WTO also apply to 
other international institutions in a historical moment in which middle-income and 
developing countries have impressive growth prospects. A transition in economic 
power presently underway associated with the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China) is still not fully accompanied by changes in representation at 
multilateral institutions. The WTO cotton case, for example, was associated with a 
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broader shift for the United States from international price-setter for cotton to one 
of many price-takers. With domestic consumption falling rapidly in the 1990s and 
2000s, even as China’s imports boomed, the United States became subject to 
fluctuations in global markets like other commodity exporters. The initial internal 
adjustment took the form of subsidies to producers. However, with farm income 
from subsidies now at risk, thanks to WTO rulings, the United States is entering a 
more intensified adjustment to global forces, one that it long imposed on others 
and avoided itself. In this period of domestic and international adjustments, the 
legitimacy of free trade and of the WTO as an organization is paramount. At the 
WTO, it is of vital importance not so much to get the facts right (which 
indisputably is of significance to the credibility of any one ruling), but to design a 
knowledge-making and adjudication system with legitimacy worldwide. While the 
WTO appears to be headed in the right direction, the path ahead remains 
formidable. 